Can Trump’s Communication to Cohen Be Seen as Obstruction of Justice?

The recent pardons of individuals associated with the Trump administration have sparked considerable debate. One of the most prominent questions revolves around the potential for such actions to be construed as obstruction of justice. This article delves into the legal implications of Trump communicating a pardon to Cohen, a convicted individual, and whether such communication could indeed qualify as obstruction.

Legal Framework and Intent

The question of whether Trump could communicate to Cohen that he will pardon him, and whether this would constitute obstruction of justice, hinges on a careful analysis of the relevant legal frameworks.

18 U.S. Code § 1512 - Tampering with a Witness, Victim, or an Informant

Section 1512 of Title 18 of the United States Code deals with tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant. Specifically, subsection b states:

“Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threats, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person with intent to—
1. Influence, delay, or prevent the testimony
2. Delay or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute of the United States to a grand jury, judge of a court, public officer, or public servant.”

The potential application of this statute would depend on the interpretation of the term "corruptly persuades." However, applying this to Trump’s communication to Cohen, the intention appears to be to delay or prevent the communication of information in an official proceeding, which could indeed fall under the scope of this law.

18 U.S. Code § 1510 - Obstruction of Criminal Investigations

Another relevant section is 1510, which deals with the obstruction of criminal investigations. According to subsection a, the statute states:

“Whoever willfully endeavors by means of
bribery to
obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute of the United States by any person to a criminal investigator shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years or both.”

In the context of Trump’s communication to Cohen, the application of this statute would similarly depend on the interpretation of the intent behind the communication. If it is deemed that the intent was to obstruct or delay the communication of information (which could be seen as a form of bribery or inducement), then this could be a basis for obstruction.

The Context and Intent of the Pardon

From a broader perspective, the pardon of individuals like Scooter Libby could be seen as a pattern that fits the broader narrative of obstruction of justice. The reasoning behind the pardon of Libby was perhaps intended to send a message to others in a similar position, including Cohen. The indirect nature of the pardon, rather than a direct communication, might be seen as a strategic attempt to avoid explicit acts of obstruction, while still achieving the desired effect.

Expert Opinon and Punditing

Many legal experts and pundits argue that direct communication from Trump to Cohen could be construed as obstruction of justice. They cite the potential for such communication to influence, delay, or prevent the proper handling of the investigation. Additionally, the cautionary approach taken by legal advisors in maintaining a certain level of separation between Trump and Cohen suggests a tacit acknowledgment of the risk involved.

Lawyers are primarily concerned with the preservation of the integrity of the legal process. If Trump were to directly communicate a pardon to Cohen, it could be seen as an attempt to hinder the flow of information that is crucial for a fair and impartial investigation. In this sense, the multitude of indirect communication methods employed by the administration might be viewed as an effort to navigate the legal landscape without crossing the line into obstruction.

Conclusion

The question of whether Trump’s communication to Cohen could be seen as obstruction of justice is complex and multifaceted. While legal experts differ in their interpretations, the indirect nature of previous pardons, coupled with the evident caution of legal advisors, suggests a nuanced and careful approach. For now, the answer remains uncertain, and continued legal analysis is warranted as the case evolves.